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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PATRICIA M. BURNHAM,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
BANKERS LIFE & CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Illinois corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
11924

BRIEF OF AP·P·ELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by Mrs. Patricia M.
Burnham seeking recovery on a life insurance policy
issued by defendant company to her husband Dr. Prestoll J. Burnham, deceased.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The court below granted defendant's motion for
a ::mmmary judgment stating that the deceased had
faile(l to disclose certain information on his reinstate1np11 t a pplica tiou and that "this failure to disclose was
a misrcpresl'ntation by omission and a fraud upon the
insurl'r. ''
1

I

i

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the summary judgment granted below and a remand for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 1, 1962, defendant Bankers Life &
Casualty Company issued a life insurance policy to Dr.
Preston J. Bun1ham. The basic policy was a whole-life
policy in the principal sum of $10,000. Attached to the
policy for an additional premium was a rider providing
a supplemental decreasing term benefit in the initial
amount of $40,000 for a fifteen-year term. The basic
policy, along with the rider, continued in force until
April 1, 1967, at which time the rider was deemed lapsed
for failure to pay premiums and the basic policy coutilrned for a certain period, premium payments being
made from the cash reserves.
On June 28, 1967, Dr. Burnham made application
for reinstatement of the policy and the rider. At that
time Dr. Burnham completed an application for rein::;tatement (R. 26) wherein he answered certain questions
concerning the state of his health.
On July 21, 1967, defendant accepted the premiums
and reinstated the insurance policies. On February 20,
1968, Dr. Burnham died of apparent suicide. On Jan nary
9, 1969, formal demand for payment was made upon the
insurance company, and it refused to pay the amount due
under the decreasing term rider. The whole life policy
2

was paid and the premiums for the decreasing term
rider were tendered back.
Between February 13, 1963, and November 9, 1965,
Dr. Preston J. Burnham and his wife, the plaintiff,
sought professional marriage counseling from Dr. Herbert B. Fowler, a doctor of psychiatry at the University
School. The deposition of Dr. Fowler indicates
that he consulted Dr. and :Mrs. Burnham on many occasions, but only in the capacity of a marriage counselor.
He stated that he did not give any treatment to Dr.
Burnham or consult with him at all except with respect
to his marital difficulties. There was no psychotherapy
given and there was no medication administered. (Deposition of Dr. Fowler, pp. 18-19). Dr. Fowler stated that
the counseling he gave might have been given just as
well by someone who was not an M.D. (Deposition of Dr.
Fowler, p. 35) and that Dr. Burnham came to him for
counselling because, in Dr. Fowler's opinion, medical
doctors with marital problems tend to seek out other
medical doctors for advice. (Deposition of Dr. Fowler,
p. 33).
Dr. Fowler further stated that although at times
Dr. Burnham had expressed to him ideas such as that
he wished he were dead, he (Dr. Fowler) did not consider these expressions serious; rather, he considered
that they were quite normal for persons in the marital
situation of Dr. Burnham. (Deposition of Dr. Fowler,
pp. 24 through 27.) Dr. Fowler stated that had he considered such expressions serious, he would have hos1ii talize<l Dr. Burnham. (Deposition of Dr. Fowler, p.

26). Dr. Fowler never gave Dr. Burnham a physical
examination or anything of that nature. (Deposition of
Dr. Fowler, p. 17.)
Dr. Burnham did not list Dr. Fowler as a "physician
or practioner" whom he had consulted on his application
for reinstatement of the policy. Defendant moved for
a summary judgment based upon the foregoing facts,
and the trial court granted that motion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY
GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUES THAT vVERE NOT BEFORE THE
COURT.
(a) The lower court judge based his fudgment on
a theory of fraud. Fra,ud was not raJised in. the
pleadings and plaintiff had no notice of this
issue.

Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides, in part:
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. (Emphasis added.)
This rule liberally allows parties to try issues that have
not been raised by the pleadings. The rule is emphatically clear, however, that such issues may only be tried
when the other party has notice of the new issues and
assents to their introduction into the case. The cases
4
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support the approach of the rule. As Mr. Justice Crockett
pointed out in Buehner Block Company v. Glezos, 6 Utah
2d 226, 310 P.2d 517, 519 (1957):
Directing attention to the claimed error in
finding partnership liability when such issue was
not raised in the pleadings : Rule 15 (b) and Rule
54 ( c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure bear
upon this problem. They provide in essence that
even though issues are not raised by the pleadings,
if they are tried by express or implied consent of
the parties, a final judgment can be rendered on
such issues. But, as this court has held on prior
occasions, the adverse party should be given the
benefit of every doubt. He must not have been
misled or in any way prejudiced by the introduction of the new issues. (Emphasis added).
The same point was put another way in the case of
National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Com7;any u. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P .2d 249, 253 ( 1955) :
Notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate technicalities and liberalize procedure, we
must not lose sight of the cardinal principle that
under our system of justice, if an issue is to be
tried and a party's rights concluded with respect
thereto, he must have notice thereof and opportunity to meet it. (Emphasis added).
In the cases cited above the court was dealing with
situations where there had been a full trial of the issues.
If consent and notice to the adverse party are necessary
in cases where there has been a full trial of the facts,
these requirements arc even more necessary for summary judgmnt, where there is less opportunity for ex1iosm·c to possible issues, where there is less time to

grasp the often-complex issue1:3 raised by the case, and
where there is less opportunity to scrutinize the weaknesses of the other party's position. If the standard of
review for cases where a full trial has been held demands
rigid scrutiny to insure that the parties have the opportunity to meet the issues raised, judicial review should
he even more intensive in cases of summary judgment.
In his memorandum decision, the lower court judge
ruled that the failure of Dr. Burnham to disclose his
visits to Dr. Fowler "constituted a fraud upon the insurnace company" (R. 56). The defendant did not adYance the theory of fraud in either its amended answer
(R. 14-15) or its original answer (R. 11-12). Nor can
the pleadings lJe construed so as to allege fraud. Rule
0 (b) of the U ath Rules of Civil Procedure specifically
provides, in part:
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be
stated with particularity. (Emphasis added).
Defendant did not plead fraud specifically or otherwise
and the issue of fraud was never before the court. The
plaintiff never had the opportunity, by affidavits or
other evidence, to meet or contest the issue. Plaintiff
was led by the pleadings to believe there was no issue
of fraud in the case. (R. 41) Yet, in his memorandum decision, the trial judge specifically states, as a conclusion
of law, that the decedent, Dr. Burnham, was guilty of
fraud. Since plaintiff had no knowledge of the issue and
consequently no opportunity to respond thereto, the
grounding of the judgment upon the basis of fraud was
prejudicial to plaintiff's rights and was fatal error.
6

(b) The lower court judge erred in, holding the
defendant could restrict or exclude liability.
This issue was not before the court.

A second new theory was advanced in the judge's
memorandum decision. In paragraph 2 of his memorandum decision, (R. 56) the judge states:
It appears clear that the company had the right
under the statute to " ... exclude or restrict liability to the same extent that such liability could
have been or was excluded or restricted when the
policy or contract was originally issued, and such
exclusion or restriction shall be effective from the
date of reinstatement. Sec. 31-22-18, U.C.A. 1953."

Though not free from ambiguity, the judge's position seems to be that Section 31-22-18 permitted the insurance company to insert a clause into its reinstated
policy limiting its liability regarding death by suicide.
This defense was never raised by the pleadings nor introduced into the proceedings before the court. In both
drfendant 's original answer (R. 12) and amended
answer (R. 15) essentially the same affirmative defense
is raised:
... the pol,icy should be contestable on the account
of fraud or misrepresentation in the material
facts stated in said application within two years
after the date of reinstatement of said policy.
(Emphasis added).
Defendant's theory of the case was that Dr. Burnham 's failure to disclose his visits with Dr. Fowler gave
the insurance company the right to contest the validity
of the entire reinstated policy and thus disaffirm the
<.'xistance of the insurance contract. The judge's memo-

raudum decision indicates that the question he was deciding was whether or not the insurance company could
limit or restrict particular forms of liability in the reinstated policy. There is a clear and important distinction between contesting the whole policy (the defense
raised) and being able to raise defenses as to exclusions
of liability (the court's holding). The two theories raise
different issues, require different forms of proof, and
can lead to very different results.
Defendant argued that the entire policy is void because of the alleged material misrepresentations. Since
it was arguing that there was no contract of insurance,
defendant returned decedent's premiums. On the other
hand, in order to use 31-22-18 in the manner in which the
lower court used it, defendant would have to argue the
policy was valid. Its argument would be that since the
policy was still valid, defendant could have reinstated
the suicide clause as a part of that policy and the suicide
clause would permit a defense to this action. Clearly,
the two theories require positions of polar inconsistency.
rro refund premiums and disaffirm the whole policy,
defendant must maintain that there is no valid policy; to
utilize the restriction-reinstatement portion of 31-22-18,
defendant must argue that the policy is still good and
that they can utilize one of the specific exclusions in the
policy. Defendant chose the former alternative and based
its case upon that theory. It was extremely prejudicial
to the plaintiff for the judge to then decide the case on
a theory which defendant apparently had itself rejected
and not raised.
8

Plaintiff's awareness of the possible relevance of
both of these issues is immaterial. It is critical, however,
that plaintiff had no opportunity to respond to them.
Clearly, one party is under no obligation to enlighten
his opponent about feasible defenses. In the present case
neither the issue of fraua nor the issue of specific exclusion of liability for suicide was raised. Even though
plaintiff may have been, in some remote sense, aware
of the existence of these issues, still, since the issues
were not raised, plaintiff was under no duty to respond
to these issues. Since the judgment was based on the
memorandum decision grounded on issues to which plaintiff had no opportunity to respond, plaintiff's rights
were abridged. This abridgement was serious; so serious,
in fact, that constitutional questions as to violation of
due process might be raised. See Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 94 L.Ed. 865,
(1950). The judgment must be reversed as it is grounded
on issues not raised in the litigation.
POINT II
THE AFFIDAVIT PRESENTED BY DEFENDANT WAS IRREGULAR AND INSUF:B-,ICIENT UNDER THE UTAH RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.
The only evidence presented by defendant in the
entire record is an affidavit of Don J. Hansen, attorney
for defendant, in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment. That affidavit is incompetent evidence
for the purpose of the motion below and this appeal,

hecause it does not conform to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rnle8 of Civil Procedure
states that affidavits in support of motions for a summary judgment must be (1) based upon personal knowledge, (2) must contain facts which would be admissible
as evidence, and (3) must show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify.
The affidavit of Don J. Hansen does not state that
he has personal knowledge regarding the alleged facts
set forth therein. In addition, the conclusion reached by
ilir. Hansen that:
Had this information been revealed to the defendant and in particular the information that
Preston J. Burnham was seeing a psychiatrist
and had expressed suicidal tendencies, said policy
of insurance would not have been renewed ...
(R. 24-25)
is clearly inadmissible. There is no showing in the affidavit that Mr. Hansen is competent to testify as to such
a conclusion. Further, the great weight of authority
holds that agents and employees of insurers may not
testify as to the materiality or effect of any alleged misstatements. See cases cited 115 A.L.R. 100, 102. In the
case of N eio York Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 7 P.2d 440
(Okla. 1932), the court refused to allow the insurance
company physician to testify that under the rules of
the insurance company he would have had to reject the
insured 's application had he kno,vn the alleged facts
omitted from the application. The court held that such
testimony was irrelevant aud immaterial since the issue
10

what reasonably prudent insurance companies would
do, not what any particular insurance company did or
would do. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Owen, 131 Pac.
1084, 1085 (Okla. 1913). The cases are clear in holding
that such testimony can only come from insurance experts,
who may state the usages of the industry as to charging
lii.<Jwr ra 1 cs or rejecting risks when aware of particular
fads. New York Life v. Carroll, supra, at 447. Thus, the
testimony of Mr. Hansen is clearly incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial and inadmissible. Rule 56 ( c) states that
r\·idencc prese11ted in affidaYits in support of a motion
for summary judgment must be admissible in evidence.
evidence presented by Mr. Hansen's affidavit cannot be considered. This point was made at the hearing
ou the motion and in plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the motion. Without the testimony contained in
the affidavit of Mr. Hansen, defendant presented no
P\'idenee whatsoever on any of the rather complex issues
in i his case. There was, therefore, no evidence in the
record upon which the lower court judge could base his
judgmeut.
\\'HS

POINT III
rrHI1J TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
.JUDGMENT BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS
AND DEPOSITIONS ON FILE SHOW CONCLUSIVELY THAT THERE ARE MATERJAL ISSUES OF FACT WHICH MUST BE
DECIDED AT TRIAL.
(a) Th ere is a material issue of fact as to
1111ietl1er the reinstatement application filled out

1!

by Dr. Burnham required the listing of visits
to a psychiatrist for marriage counselling.
The questions on the reinstatement application (R.
26) are pointedly directed to the applicant's physical
health. Question No. 4 asks about tuberculosis. Question
No. 5 asks if the applicant is now in good health and if
he uses alcoholic beverages. Question No. 6 then requests
that the applicant state every physician or practitioner
whom he has consulted or who had treated him. The
clear implication of Question No. 6 is that the consultations and treatments of which the question requests information are those relating to physical illness. This is
further borne out by the next question. Question No. 7 '
states:
What illnesses or injuries have you had other
than those sfoted above? What operations 1 (Emphasis added).
This question clearly contemplates that the preceding
questions dealt with an illness or an injury, not with
marital difficulties. Had the insurance company wished
to elicit information regarding marriage counselling,
such a question could have been included. The application for reinstatement contains a patent ambiguity which
must be resolved at a trial where evidence can be presented and where the jury can determine whether there
was in fact an omission or misrepresentation clue to the
ambiguous nature of the application. Faced with this
ambiguity, a jury could reasonably decide that the failure to disclose the marital counselling visits was no
omission at all - since such a disclosure was not requested by the application.

1

1

There was absolutely no evidence in the record from
which the court could determine whether there was a
misrepresentation or omission on the application. Obviously, if the application blank is ambiguous, and reasonable men could believe that the application does not
require the listing of visits to a psychiatrist for marriage
counseling, then there was no misrepresntation or omission and one need not even reach the question of materiality. Sice the court had no evidence upon which to base
its conclusion that there "was a misrepresentation by
omission'' in the reinstatement application, the judgment of the court must be overturned and the case be
remanded for jury trial on that issue.
(b) There were material issues of fact as to

·whether the alleged fa.ilure of Dr. Burnham to
disclose that he had seen Dr. Fowler for marriage counseling constituted fraud, was material
either to the acceptance of the risk or to the
hazard assumed by the insurer, or caused the
insurer to issue a policy which it would not haf/Je
issued in good faith if the facts had been made
known to the insurer.
Any alleged misstatements in an application for insurance or reinstatement of insurance are governed by
of Utah Code Annotated. That scetion provides
that all statements and descriptions in such applications
are deemed to he representations and not warranties.
The section further states:
Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment
of facts, and incorrect statements shall not prevent a recovery under the policy or contract
unless:
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(a) fraudulent; or
(b) material either to the acceptance of the
risk, or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or
( c) the insurer in good faith either would not
have issued. the policy or contract, or would not
have issued, reinsta,ted or renewed it at the same
premium rate or would not have issued, reinstated or renewed the policy or contract in as large
an amount, or ·would not have provided coverage
with respect to the hazard resulting in a loss, if
the true facts had been made known to the insurer as required either by the application of the
policy or contract or otherwise. (Emphasis added).
Thus, the possible issues of fact under this statute
are (a) was there a misrepresentation or omission of
fact; (b) was Dr. Preston J. Burnham guilty of fraud
in the application for reinstatement; ( c) if there were
misrepresentations or omissions as to facts, were these
misrepresentations or omissions material either to the
acceptance of the risk or to the hazard as::mmed by the
insurer; and ( d) if there were misrepresentations or
omissions of facts, would the true facts, had they been
known by the insurer, haYe caused the insurer to, in
good faith, refuse to reinstate the policy or to reinstate
it at the same premium, or to reinstate it in as large
an amount, or to provide coverage with respect to the
hazard resulting in the loss. Each of the issues set forth
above requires determinations of fact.
Further, however, the pleadings m this case raise
no issue as to fraud, sec c1isc-ussion, sllpra, at 4-6, and the
only issue clearly raised by the pleadings is set forth in
defendant's amended answer as foll(rws:

14

Defendant further alleges that at said time
aud place the deceased made a material misrepresentation of material facts and that if said facts
had been known to defendant at said time, the
policy would not have been reinstated. (R. 15)
(Emphasis added).
That clef ense raises an issue under
(b) (omission
material to the risk) and possibly an issue under subsection (c) (good faith refusal to reinstate). As to the
latter sub-section, however, it is the position of appellant
that the pleadings raise no issue. There is no allegation
tliat the insurer "in good faith" would not have issued
the policy. A showing of good faith is essential to establish that defense. Since no good faith is alleged or
sho\vn that portiou of the defendant's affirmative defense stating that it would not have reinstated the policy
is of no effect. Thus, the only issues raised in this case
are 1vhether there were misrepresentations, omissions
or coucealments of fact aud whether, if there were such
misrepresentations, omissions or concealments of fact,
these were material either to the acceptance of the risk
or to the hazard assumed. by the insurer.
The evidence shows that Dr. Burnham did not list
Dr. Fowler as a physician or practitioner whom he had
eommltccl. Even assuming that such failure was in fact
an omission (see discussion, supra, at p. 11-13) defenllant still has the burden of sho1ving the omission to be
material.
Proof that a misrepresentation, omission or concealment was material either to the acceptance of the risk
15

or the hazard assumed by the insurer requires an extensive showing by the defendant. The cases hold that
the test for determining the materiality of a fact or
matter as to which a misrepresentation or omission is
made to the insurer by an applicant for insurance is to
be found in the answer to the question whether reasonably careful and intelligent underwriters would have regarded the fact or matter omitted or communicated at the
time of eff erting the insurance as substantially increasing the chances of loss insured against so as to bring
about a rejection of the risk or the charging of an increased premium. Columbia Ins. Co. 1:. Lawrence, 10 Pet.
507, 9 L.Ed. 512 (1836); American Eagle F. Ins. Co. v.
Peoples Compress Co., 156 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1946);
Zogg v. Bankers Life Co., 62 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1933);
Scott v. National Reserve Life Ins. Co., 143 Kan. 678, 56
P.2d 76 (1936). See 43 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance
Specifically as to the materiality of omissions or misrepresentations regarding medical consultations, the cases
hold that if the knowledge of a consultation with a physician for a certain ailment would have led a reasonably
prudent insurer to decline the application or to "rate up"
the applicant, a false statement or omission by the applicant which in effect concealed from the insurer the knowledge that the applicant had had such consultation is
material to the risk. Otherwise, it is not. New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Price, 16 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1927). See Annotation 131 A.L.R. 617, 619. Thus, the materiality of a false
statement or omission as to -whether the applicant had
consulted physicians is to be determined by whether this
statement or omission naturally temlPd to influence the
16

judgment of the underwriter in making the contract-in
estimating the degree or character of the risk or fixing
the premium rate. Such misrepresentations and omissions are material where they influence the decision of
the insurer in accepting the risk or in fixing the terms of
the contract. See Annotation 131 A.L.R. 617, 619.
From the above it is evident that the question of
materiality cannot be determined on the record before
the court. Defendant, who had the fiurden to show
materiality, introduced absolutely no evidence with regard to what a reasonably prudent insurer would have
done had it known the information allegedly omitted.
The only indication as to the basis upon which the
trial court granted the motion for summary judgment
is found in his memorandum decision. There is no finding in the memorandum decision with regard to materiality. Nor is there any finding in that opinion with regard to whether or not the insurer would have in good
faith refused to reinstate the policy had it known the
information. The opinion of the trial court merely states
that:
It is the view of the court [not a reasonably
prudent insurer] that Dr. Burnham's failure to
disclose prevented the insurer from exercising
its right to evaluate what it might have learned
from Dr. Fowler and to apply the restriction to
the reinstated policy and that this failure to disclose was a misrepresentation by omission and a
fraud upon the insurer. (R. 56) (Emphasis added).

17

The statute above cited (
does not grant m1
insurer an absolute right to void a policy for misrepresentations or omissions. r.rhe only right granted is a right
to void the policy if the insurer can show fraud, material
misrepresentation or that it in good faith would not have
issued the policy had it kno"-n the facts. The court below
treated the matter as if the statements on the applicaion were in fact warranties and the insurer had an absolute right to void the policy for any misstatement or
omission breaching the wananty. Utah Code Annotated
states that such statements are 11ot warranties.
The conclusion of the court is clearly erroneous.
Further, the court had lwfon' it absolutely no facts
upon which it could make any lletennination with regard
to fraud, materiality or g·ood faith. Defrndant did not
present any such evidence, and it was its duty to do so,
siuce the question was raised by '>my of defom,;e.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that this
case contains material issues of fact which cannot he
decided upon the record before the court nor upon a
motion for
judgmc•nt. The jrnlgment of the
trial court should be reversecl.

POINT IV
\VAS KOT ENTITLED TO A
SUl\DIARY JUDCBIENT AS A l\1AT11 ER OF
LAW.
(a) Tlic rn11rt crrl'd i11 1·011d111/i11,r1 tliat rlrcede11t
co111111ittcd a. fraud on tlic i11s11rance conipany.

18

Thl· court below described the governing issue in the
case thusly:

1'he governing issue presented to the court seems
to be whether, upon request by decedent that his
life insurance policy be reinstated, his failure to
disclose numerous visits to Dr. Fowler constituted a fraud upon the insurance company. (R. 56)
This statement of the is:me by the court must be considrred to be the ground upon which his decision is based.
Utah Code Annotated
provides that misl'C'pr0sentations, omissions or concealments of fact may
11re,·ent reeovery under an insurance policy if fraudulent. The Utah Supreme Court has listed the elements
of fraud as (1) a representation (2) its falsity (3) its
mat0riality (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or
ignorance of its truth ( 5) the speaker's intent that it
should be acted upon by the person and in the manner
reasonably contemplated (6) the hearer's ignorance of
its falsity (7) the hearer's reliance upon its truth (8)
the hearN's right to rely thereon, and (9) the proximate
nml consequent injury of the hearer. Stuck v. Delta Land
d'- ff atcr Co., 227 Pac. 791 (Utah 1924). The person
allrging fraud has the burden of establshing each of the
l'l'qnired elements. 'l'he Utah court has consistently held
that proof of fraud requires that a deceit must be practiee<l in coujundio11 with the other requisites and elements of fraud and that there must be a wilfully false
repn sentation of material facts which the defrauded
person reasonably relies upon to his injury. Auerbach v.
Samuels, 10 Utah 2d 152, 349 P.2d 1112 (1960); Pace v.
1
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Parrish, 112 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952); Oberg v.
Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229 (1947).

The court in the instant case had absolutely no facts
upon which to base its legal conclusion that decendent
committed a fraud npon the insurance company. There
are no facts in the record to establish the nine elements
of fraud. The obvious reasons for there being no facts
in the record upon which to base such a decision is that
the issue of fraud was never raised by the pleadings and
never considered by either of the parties. See discussion,
supra, at 4-6.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment below
should be reversed and the case shonld be remamled for
a new trial.
(b) Tl1 c court erred in concluding that the
suicide clause co11ld be reinstated upon reinstatement of the policy.

The weight of authority holds that reinstatement of
an insurance policy does not begin anew the period of
the suicide clause. See authorities cited 7 "\VILLISTON,
CONTRACTS
n.5. Further, it is held that:
Unless it has reserved such a right [to reinstate
the suicide clause] in the original policy, or
grants reinstatement as a matter of grace rather
than of contract right on the part of the insured,
the insurer's attempt to make a reinstated policy
exclude death from suicide . . . after reinstatement is ineffective as being in conflict with the
insured's contractual right to reinstatement upon
compliance with the conditions set forth in the
20

original policy .... 7 W I LL I S T 0 N , C 0 N TRACTS
p. 654.
rrhe policy in the instant case contains a contractual
provision for reinstatement. (R. 9). Thus, reinstatement
is not a matter of grace and the insurer cannot be allowed to break its contract to reinstate by insisting upon
additional conditions not contained in the reinstatement
agreement of the original policy. The reinstatement
agreement in the policy does not provide for i·einstatement of the suicide clause. The court clearly erred in
hohling that defendant could reinstate the suicide clause.
Further, the Utah statutes involved prevent the result reached by the court below. Section 31-22-15 of the
Utah Code Annotated ( Repl. Vol. 1966) states:

Suicide-From and after the effective date of
this act, the suicide of the policyholder after the
second policy year of any policy written by any
life insurance company doing business in this
state shall not be a defense against the payment
of a life insurance policy, whether such suicide
was voluntary or involuntary and whether such
policyholder was sane or insane .... (Emphasis
added).
To the same effect is the paragraph regarding suicide
fonnd on page 2 of the policy (R. 9) which states:
If within two years of the date of the issue of this
policy the insured shall die by suicide, while sane
or insane, the liabiltiy of the company shall be
limited to an amount equal to the premiums which
have been paid for this policy. (Emphasis added).
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Both the Utah statute and the provision in the policy refer to a period ending two years from the date of issue
of the policy. The policy in question was issued on January 1, 1962. Thus, on January 1, 1964, by statute and
by provision of the policy itself, liability could no longer
be limited where death was by suicide.
The law is clear in this state that reinstatement of
the policy does not create a new contract but rather continues in existence the original contract. Such a right to
reinstatement of an insurance policy is a contractual
right which the insured obtains upon purchasing thr
initial policy. Gressler v. New York Life
Co.,
156 P.2d 212; rehearing 163 P.2d 324 (Utah 1945 ).
Since the right to limit recovery because of death
by suicide expires two years from the date of issue of the
policy, according to Utah statute, it is entirely erroneous
to hold that such a right can begin running anew upon
reinstatement of a policy. The date of issue of a reinstated policy still remains the date of issue on the original policy because under Utah law reinstatement continu<>s in effect the contract-it does not create a new
contract. See Gressler, supra. Thus, by the terms of the
statute, even if the insurer
to reinstate the suicide
clause it would still be subject to the statutory limitation
and expire two years after date of issue of the policy. In
tht• instant case the suicide clause would have expired
on January 1, 1964. The tric:il court held that under §3122-18, Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol. 1966) the insurer had a right to reinstate the suicide clause. That
l"tatute lH'OYideH, in part, that:
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\\Then any life insurance policy or annuity contract is reinstated, such reinstated policy or contract may exclude or restrict liability to the same
extent that such liability could have been or was
excluded or restricted when the policy or contract was originally issued, and such exclusion
or restriction shall be effective from the date of
reinstatement.
Clearly, this statute must be read in conjunction with the
Rpecific statute on suicide, Utah Code Annotated 31-2215. When the two are read together, it becomes obvious
that suicide is not one of the "exclusions or restrictions"
\\'hieh may be reinstated pursuant to 31-22-18. It is an
elementary rule of statutory interpretation that the specific mandate of the statute must overrule any general
prov1s10n.
Further, the court erred in so ruling because the
issue was never raised by defendant and defendant never
eontended that it had a right to exclude liability based
upon suicide. See discussion, supra, pp. 7-9. In addition,
there are no facts in the record from which the court
could conclude that the company would have reinstated
the suicide clause (assuming they could legally do so)
had they known that Dr. Burnham had been visiting a
psychiatrist for marriage counseling. Under
of
the Utah Code Annotated, misrepresentations may not
he used to prevent recovery unless fraudulent, material
to the acceptance of the risk or hazard, or unless such
misrepresentations cause the insurer ot issue a policy
which they in good f a.ith would not have issued had they
known the facts. See discussion, supra, at 13-18. There is
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no evidence whatsoever in this record upon \vhich the
court could base any finding sustainable under this
statute.
Therefore, it is submitted that the insurer had no
right to reinstate the suicide elause and in fact was prohibited from so doing by Utah statute. Further, even if
the insurance company had the right to reinstate the
suicide clause, misrepresentations or omissions which
led them to fail to reinstate the clause can only prevent
recovery if fraudulent or material to the acceptance of
the risk or if the insurer in good faith would not have
issued a policy had it known the facts. There is no evidence in this record as to what the insurer would have
done had it known the facts. FurthL•r, there is no evidence
as to materiality and there is no evidence as to fraud.
The judgment of the trial court must be overturned and
the case must be remanded for trial.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the lo\Yer court should be reversed
because that judgment was improperly based on issues
not before the court. Furthermore, defendant's affidavit,
the only evidence presented by defendant, was irregular
and insufficient under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
rrhe trial court further ened in granting defendant's
motion for summary judgment. The pleadings and depositions on file conclusidey show that th0re are material
issues of fact that can only be Jecided at trial. Finally,
<lcfrndant \\'as not e11titled to summary judgment as a
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matter of law, and the lower court erred in its conclusion
that a fraud was committed upon the insurance company.
'fhe court furtlwr erred in concluding that the suicide
clause could be reiucluded iu the reinstated policy. Because of these errors, the judgment must be reversed
and the case must he remanded for trial
Respectfully submitted,

MULLINER, PRINCE &
_MANGUM
Robert M. Yeates
Denis R. Morrill
Kenneth W. Yeates
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